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1  | INTRODUC TION
Adolescence, the phase of the lifespan between childhood and 
adulthood, is a period of life associated with wide- ranging social, 
emotional, and cognitive development. During this time, there 
are normative changes in social attunement (Blakemore, 2008; 
Steinberg & Morris, 2001), reward- related motivation (Defoe, 
Dubas, Figner, & van Aken, 2015), and future oriented thinking 
(van den Bos, Rodriguez, Schweitzer, & McClure, 2015). One pos-
sible manifestation of these complex, co- developing processes is the 
phenomenon of peer influence on decision- making. A host of data 
on adolescents’ risky behaviors indicates that they are more subject 
to peer influence when engaging in risk taking behavior in the real 
world (Eaton et al., 2010). Peer influence on risk taking is an impor-
tant public health issue, in that risk taking during adolescence can 
result in both short- term and lifelong negative consequences. One 
example is the increased crash rate of adolescent drivers with peer 
passengers compared to driving alone (Simons- Morton, Lerner, & 
Singer, 2005). The present study aims to expand our understanding 
of when adolescents are subject to peer influence by testing how in-
formation about the previous choices of peers influences adolescent 
and adult decision- making.
Laboratory research can help reveal the mechanisms of the com-
plex phenomenon of peer influence on adolescent decision- making. 
It is important to consider that ‘peer influence’ is a multi- layered phe-
nomenon (Trautmann & Vieider, 2012) that can range from active 
monitoring by peers (Cascio et al., 2015; Kretsch & Harden, 2014) to 
subtle manipulations of social norms (Paluck & Shepherd, 2012). For 
example, previous work has demonstrated that adolescents tend to 
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Abstract
Adolescents take more risks when peers monitor their behavior. However, it is largely 
unknown how different types of peer influence affect adolescent decision- making. In 
this study, we investigate how information about previous choices of peers differen-
tially influences decision- making in adolescence and young adulthood. Participants 
(N = 99, age range 12–22) completed an economic choice task in which choice options 
were systematically varied on levels of risk and ambiguity. On each trial, participants 
selected between a safer choice (low variability in outcome) and a riskier choice (high 
variability in outcome). Participants made choices in three conditions: a solo condi-
tion in which they made choices with no additional information, a social condition in 
which they saw choices of supposed peers, and a computer condition in which they 
saw choices of a computer. Results showed that participants’ choices conform to the 
choices made by the peers, but not a computer. Furthermore, when peers chose the 
safe option, late adolescents were especially likely to make a safe choice. Conversely, 
when the peer made a risky choice, late adolescents were least likely to follow choices 
made by the peer. We did not find evidence for differential influence of social infor-
mation on decisions depending on their level of risk and ambiguity. These results 
show that information about previous decisions of peers are a powerful modifier for 
behavior and that the effect of peers on adolescents’ decisions is less ubiquitous and 
more specific than previously assumed.
Materials can be accessed through the 
Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/
yp2sb/).
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is in the room (Chein, Albert, O’Brien, Uckert, & Steinberg, 2011) or 
in a virtual context (Van Hoorn, Van Dijk, Guroglu, & Crone, 2016). 
Other studies have operationalized peer influence differently such 
as providing information about how risky peers rated a situation 
(Knoll, Magis- Weinberg, Speekenbrink, & Blakemore, 2015).
One less understood form of peer influence is receiving informa-
tion about the decision- making preferences of other peers. This form 
of peer influence is common in the real world. For instance, after a 
party an adolescent might decide to drive home after drinking alco-
hol if they have seen their peers make the same decision in the past. 
Previous studies using choice information about other participants’ 
decisions showed that choice information from peers is a power-
ful modifier for behavior (Asch, 1951; Chung, Christopoulos, King- 
Casas, Ball, & Chiu, 2015; Klucharev, Hytönen, Rijpkema, Smidts, & 
Fernández, 2009; Welborn et al., 2016; Zaki, Schirmer, & Mitchell, 
2011). The design of the current study was based on a study in adults 
(Chung et al., 2015). In this study, participants changed their choice 
preference towards more risky choices when other participants had 
selected the risky option and towards more safe choices when the 
other participants had selected the safe option. In the current study, 
we used a similar design to test the influence of decision- making 
preferences by showing participants the choices of their peers to 
evaluate whether adolescents are more likely to follow the risk pref-
erences of others.
Like peer influence, decision- making is also composed of sev-
eral underlying subprocesses. Classic economic decision theory 
has demonstrated two important factors that predictably bias deci-
sions in adults: risk and ambiguity (Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & 
Glimcher, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). When making choices 
between options with variable outcomes, risk refers to choices with 
known probabilities of outcomes, whereas in an ambiguous choice 
the probabilities of outcomes are unknown. Recent studies have 
investigated whether increased tolerance for risk and/or ambigu-
ity could explain increased engagement in risky behaviors, such as 
drinking alcohol, in adolescence. Regarding risk tolerance, studies 
have found mixed results in which some studies find increases in 
risk tolerance in adolescence (Braams, van Duijvenvoorde, Peper, & 
Crone, 2015; Powers et al., 2018; van den Bos & Hertwig, 2017), 
whereas others have not found differences between adolescents 
and adults (Blankenstein, Crone, van den Bos, & van Duijvenvoorde, 
2016; Van Leijenhorst, Westenberg, & Crone, 2008). Three studies 
so far have compared ambiguity tolerance between adolescents 
and adults. These studies found that adolescents are more tolerant 
towards ambiguity than adults (Blankenstein, Peper, Crone, & van 
Duijvenvoorde, 2017; Tymula et al., 2012; van den Bos & Hertwig, 
2017). Previous studies have shown that peer influence can increase 
risky decision- making (Cascio et al., 2015; Chein et al., 2011).
However, it is currently unknown whether increases in engage-
ment in risky behavior under peer influence are driven by changes 
in risk tolerance, ambiguity tolerance or both. One possibility is that 
participants follow choices of others regardless of decision type, 
that is, risky vs. ambiguous. This could be due to social processes 
such as conformity. Conformity refers to changes in behavior to 
match behavior of others (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). If confor-
mity is the driving factor of behavioral change we would expect to 
see participants altering their choices to match the peers’ choices, 
but we would not expect to see differential effects of peer influ-
ence on risky and ambiguous choices. Another possibility is that 
peers selectively alter risk or ambiguity tolerance. Information 
about peers’ risk could selectively influence participants’ risk (but 
not ambiguity) tolerance if information about peers’ choices alters 
explicit expected value computations to be more aligned to the 
peer’s choice. In ambiguous situations, there is less information on 
which to base a decision since the probabilities of obtaining the 
rewards are unknown. Potentially, adults and adolescents are in-
fluenced through the same mechanisms, but due to the enhanced 
importance of peers in adolescence, adolescents might value and 
incorporate the choices of others more than participants of other 
ages, resulting in higher peer influence in adolescence. The current 
study investigates developmental changes in effects of informa-
tion about others’ choices on risky decision- making and whether 
these changes in risky decision- making are driven by changes in 
risk or ambiguity tolerance. Participants performed a monetary 
decision- making task in which they made choices between a safer 
and a more risky option. Choice options were systematically var-
ied on levels of risk and ambiguity. For some decisions, partici-
pants received information about the choices of supposed peers 
of a similar age who had completed the study previously. To iso-
late the influence of social information on risky and ambiguous 
decision- making, these trials were compared to a solo condition 
in which participants made the same decisions but without seeing 
any information about other participants’ choices.
Choices of supposed peers were manipulated to sometimes 
select the safer option and sometimes select the risky option. 
Importantly, participants were never instructed to follow the choice 
of the other participant or the computer; thus any changes from 
baseline can be inferred to result from the spontaneous use of that 
information by the participant. We hypothesized that adolescents 
would be more likely to follow choice preferences from peers and 
that adolescents would be especially likely to follow others’ risky 
choices. Furthermore, we expected that peer influence would be 
RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS
• We investigated developmental changes in the impact 
of peers’ choices on risky and ambiguous choices.
• Social information is a more powerful modifier than 
computer-generated information.
• Adolescents are most influenced by safe decisions of 
others, and this age group was least influenced by risky 
decisions of others.
• We show that the effect of peer on adolescents’ deci-
sions is less ubiquitous and more specific than previ-
ously assumed.
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more prominent in certain decision contexts. Based on previous 
work (Chung et al., 2015) we hypothesized that social information 
will change risk preferences and that social information would be 
an especially strong modifier for behavior in ambiguous choice sit-
uations. In ambiguous choice situations there is less information to 
guide decision- making. We expected that extra information, in this 
case information about others’ choices, could therefore be utilized 
more by participants. Lastly, we aimed to disentangle the influence 
of a social agent’s choices in particular from the availability of in-
formation more generally, so we included a third condition in which 
participants saw choices of a non- social agent (i.e. a computer). 
Altogether, this study will shed light on developmental changes in 
the interaction between social information and different aspects 
of a complex decision- making process. Understanding these com-




One hundred and fourteen participants between 12–22 years old 
participated in the study. Eleven participants were excluded because 
they made less than 5% or more than 95% risky choices (Mage = 19.3, 
Rangeage = 13.7–22.4), meaning that they did not scale their choices 
to reflect differences in probability of winning the high amount of 
money (see task design). Six participants were excluded from analy-
ses because they did not believe that the supposed peers were real 
people (Mage = 19.8, Rangeage = 18.0–22.4). Two participants were 
excluded based on both criteria, meaning that the total number of 
excluded participants was 15. The total sample for analyses con-
tained 99 participants (47 males), Mage = 17.1, Rangeage = 12.1–22.7). 
A chi- squared test did not indicate a difference in sex distribution 
across age (χ2(10) = 6.56, p = 0.765 (note that age was binned per 
year for this analysis, see Supplemental Figure 1). All data were 
checked for outliers. When appropriate, robust analyses were run 
if possible, which downweight the influence of extreme scores and 
therefore provide a more stable estimation of parameters. As there 
are no robust alternatives for nonlinear mixed effects models, par-
ticipants who changed their choices more than 3 standard deviations 
of the mean were excluded for the social information conditions. 
This resulted in exclusion of one additional participant in the social 
safe condition and one additional participant in the social risky con-
dition. Note that these participants’ data were included for the other 
conditions.
Since no prior work has investigated developmental changes in 
social influence it was not possible to use effect sizes of prior work 
in a power analysis to determine sample size a priori. However, the 
sample size for the current study was chosen based on a task previ-
ously used in an adult sample (Chung et al., 2015). In this study par-
ticipants saw risky and safe choices of others. Based on effect sizes 
of changes in behavior in this study (following towards a risky choice: 
Cohen’s d = .75; Following towards a safe choice: Cohen’s d = 1.0; see 
Chung et al., 2015) we would need 16 subjects to reach 80% power 
at α error probability p < 0.05 in an adult sample based on the smaller 
 effect size of the two. However, in the current study the main anal-
ysis of interest is not a paired t test, but a non- linear mixed effects 
model to detect age- related changes. Furthermore, we included an 
ambiguity manipulation and we were interested in an interaction 
between age, social condition, ambiguity, and risk. We doubled the 
original sample size to account for the addition of the ambiguity fac-
tor and again doubled the sample size to ensure sufficient represen-
tation of participants across age. Therefore, we collected usable data 
from at least four times the number of participants resulting from the 
power analysis. As this was an estimation of minimal needed power, 
we opted to acquire additional data until we acquired approximately 
100 usable participants.
The total duration of the session was 2 hours. Participants were 
paid $20 for participation and received additional bonus money. 
Participants believed that bonus money was related to performance 
on the task, whereas in actuality all participants received $5 bonus 
money at the end of the task. Recruitment was performed in the 
Boston- Cambridge area using an online recruitment platform and 
a participant database. Care was taken to match the adult sample 
to the community sample of minors by recruiting members of the 
general public and limiting the number of Harvard undergraduate 
students in the adult sample. In the adult sample the total percent-
age of Harvard undergraduate students was 35%. Adult participants 
provided informed consent; parent permission and participant as-
sent were obtained for minors. This study was approved by the 
Committee on the Use of Human Subjects at Harvard University.
2.2 | Task
2.2.1 | Social manipulation
Participants were led to believe that in the social condition they 
would see choices of previous participants, which were actually 
experimentally manipulated to depict certain profiles of risk pref-
erence. Before the start of the task, participants rated 15 pictures 
of similar aged and gender matched individuals. Participants rated 
these individuals on seven different questions assessing dimensions 
such as niceness, friendliness and popularity (see Supplementary 
Materials for details). Ratings were made on a continuous scale with 
anchors ‘not at all’ and ‘extremely’. Participants indicated their rating 
with a slider on the scale. Participants were told that these people 
were previous participants in the study and to make it believable 
that we took a picture of previous participants, the experimenter 
also took a picture of the participant. To ensure that participants 
saw choices of those individuals that they were most interested in, 
participants were asked to select three individuals for whom they 
would see choices in the task. Selected individuals received higher 
ratings on each of the seven different dimensions, that is, attrac-
tiveness, possibility of becoming friends, niceness, popularity, simi-
larity, whether the participant thought the other person was more 
attractive and whether the participant thought the other person 
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was more popular, than non- chosen individuals (see Supplementary 
Materials).We then randomly assigned each of these peers to three 
decision- making types: a risky peer, a safe peer and a neutral peer. 
The ‘Neutral peer’ made 50% risky choices and 50% safe choices. 
We intended to show 75% risky choices for the ‘Risky peer’ and 75% 
safe choices for the ‘Safe peer’. However, due to a technical error 69 
participants saw 77% risky choices for the ‘Risky peer’, and 76% safe 
choices for the ‘Safe peer’. Note that despite the slight difference in 
which peer made the choices, in total all participants saw 50% of so-
cial information trials where a hypothetical peer endorses the risky 
choice, and 50% where a hypothetical peer endorses a safer choice.
Peers’ choices appeared intermixed during the social block, and 
were analyzed for trial- by- trial adaptation of the participants’ risk 
preferences to match the risky or safe choices of the peer. The anal-
ysis targets shifts in choices at the level of individual trials, not based 
on whether the participant shifted their choice toward the individ-
ual peer who tended to make mostly risky or mostly safe choices. 
Participants were fully debriefed about the social manipulation at 
the end of the session.
2.2.2 | Trial structure
On each trial, participants viewed two lotteries that varied in risk 
and ambiguity over trials, and chose their preferred lottery. Lotteries 
were represented graphically as bars with the colors of the bars rep-
resenting the chance of winning different amounts (see Figure 1). 
Trials started with a 1s onset screen showing ‘New Round’ followed 
by a display of the two lotteries. After 6s the participant could in-
dicate their choice (free response) after which their choice was 
displayed for 2s. In total, the task consisted of 300 trials, 60 per con-
dition (see below).
In each trial, both lotteries had the same probability of win-
ning, but the amount of money that could be won with each lottery 
varied systematically. Within each pair, for one of the lotteries the 
amounts of money were less different, hereafter referred to as the 
‘safer’ option (lower outcome variability), and for the other lottery 
the amounts were more different, hereafter referred to as the ‘risky’ 
 option (greater outcome variability). High and low amounts were 
based on Chung et al. (2015) and divided by 10 to make the amounts 
that could be won on each trial more appropriate for a developmen-
tal population. For the safer options, the difference between the high 
and low amount varied from $0.06 to $1.01, and for the risky  options, 
the difference between the high and low amount varied from $3.63 
to $5.51. The probability of winning the high amount of money varied 
between 40% to 90% with increments of 10% (see Figure 1).
For some trials, part of the bar was occluded, introducing am-
biguity. Levels of ambiguity varied between 0% and 80% with 
increments of 20% (see Figure 1). In total there were eight dif-
ferent counterbalanced trial presentations. Probabilities of win-
ning the high amount were presented in either blue or red, the 
location of the high and low amount were presented on the top 
or bottom of the bar, and safer and risky choices were presented 
on either the left or right side of the screen. Counterbalance was 
assigned between subjects, that is, participants were assigned to 
one trial presentation and this was held consistent throughout 
the task.
2.2.3 | Conditions
The task was composed of three blocks. In the solo block, partici-
pants made choices and did not see any other information, which 
was used to quantify baseline risk preferences. During the social 
block, participants saw the supposed previous choices of other par-
ticipants while making their choices. Trials in the social block dis-
played a name and a picture of one other (supposed) participant 
along with a green rectangle above his or her selection (see Figure 2). 
Choices of the peers (i.e. risky peer, safe peer and the neutral peer) 
were presented intermixed in the social block. During the computer 
block, participants saw the random choices of a computer serving 
as a comparison condition in which additional information about 
another choice was available but devoid of a social target. In the 
computer block, the screen displayed the choice of the computer 
(denoted by a computer icon), which randomly selected one of the 
lotteries. The computer’s choice was displayed above the bars and 
was indicated by a green rectangle.
In total this resulted in five conditions: solo, computer safe, 
computer risky, social safe and social risky. The order of the blocks 
(solo, social, computer) was fully counterbalanced between subjects, 
achieved by randomly assigning participants to one of six counter-
balanced block orders. A chi- square test did not support the possi-
bility that counterbalance orders was dependent on age (χ2(70) = 
70.18, p = 0.47).
2.2.4 | Raven progressive matrices
To exclude the possibility that differences in non- verbal fluid intel-
ligence drove choice behavior, participants completed a nine- item 
abbreviated version of the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices 
Test. Selection of items was based on Bilker et al. (2012). Data were 
missing for one participant.
F IGURE  1 Display of the different 
probability levels (panel a) and ambiguity 
levels (panel b) used in the task. In the task 
all ambiguity levels could be paired with 
all probability levels0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Ambiguity levels
40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Probabilities of winning high amount(a) (b)
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2.3 | Procedure
Participants were tested in a quiet room. After consenting, par-
ticipants received an explanation about the task and were led 
through guided practice with the experimenter to ensure that 
each participant understood the task. Comprehension of the 
probabilities and ambiguity was confirmed during the practice by 
the experimenter. Participants then completed the task. After the 
task participants filled out the Raven short. The session ended 
with debriefing and payment. A funnel debrief was used to as-
sess whether participants believed that the choices were made 
by other previous participants. In the debriefing interview, par-
ticipants were first asked to describe how they made choices and 
whether they paid attention to the choices of others. If partici-
pants indicated that they did not pay attention to the choices of 
others we asked them if there was a specific reason why they 
did not pay attention to those choices. If participants said they 
did not believe that the choices were made by other people, they 
were excluded from analysis, see Participants section for more 
details.
2.4 | Data analysis
The goal of the study was to identify how risky and ambiguous 
choice behavior are influenced by social information and to in-
vestigate how the influence of social information changes over 
development. The dependent variable in all mixed effects models 
was choice on the trial- by- trial level. Risky choices were coded as 
1 and safer choices as 0. Choice data in the solo condition were 
inspected for normality. Choice data ranged between 5% and 90% 
average risky choice. The average percent risky choice in the solo 
condition was 33%.
We included risk and ambiguity level of the lottery to test how 
these variables influenced percent risky choice. Within pairs of 
choice options on a given trial, we define the riskier option as the 
one with higher outcome variability (greater range between winning 
and losing amounts; Levy et al., 2010; Tymula et al., 2012). We then 
computed the expected value for each choice option and subtracted 
the risky from the safe expected value as a predictor of choice. For 
example, if for the risky option the chance of winning $3.72 was 60% 
and the chance of winning $0.11 was 40%, the expected value for 
this option was (0.6*$3.72) + (.4*$0.11) = $2.27. If for the safe option 
the chance of winning $2.44 was 60% and the chance of winning 
$2.30 was 40%, the expected value of this option was (0.6*$2.44) + 
(0.4*$2.30) = $2.38. In this example, the expected value difference 
would	be	$−0.11,	indicating	that	based	on	expected	value	the	safe	
option would be the mathematically optimal choice. These values 
were entered into analyses; representing the difference in expected 
value would be required to shift participants away from the safe 
choice, a proxy for risk aversion.
Expected	value	differences	ranged	between	−$0.41	and	$2.35,	
with negative values indicating that the safe choice was more 
F IGURE  2 Task design. Trials started with a screen showing ‘New Round’ (not displayed). Participants were then presented with a screen 
on which they could see the choice options. In the social condition, participants saw a picture of the other person and the choice of the 
other person, displayed as a green bar over the selection. Other people were the same gender and age category as the participants. The 
example displays an 18–22- year- old male. In the computer condition, participants saw a computer icon and the word ‘computer’ along with 
the selection. After 6 seconds, the selection activated (denoted by green outline) and the participant indicated their own selection (self- 
paced). Trials ended with a 2- second display of their choice, denoted in green above the selection






















6 of 13  |     BRAAMS et Al.
mathematically advantageous and positive values indicating the 
risky choice was more advantageous. These values were skewed 
positively to provoke participants to overcome natural risk aver-
sion, consistent with prior work. Ambiguity level of the choice was 
included as a continuous variable and could take values of 0%, 20%, 
40%, 60% and 80%. Interactions between age, expected value dif-
ference and ambiguity were tested to investigate whether expected 
value difference and ambiguity differentially affected choice be-
havior for the different ages. Lastly, interactions between condi-
tion, age, expected value and ambiguity were tested to investigate 
whether the magnitude of change in the influence conditions was 
differentially dependent on expected value difference and ambigu-
ity for the different ages.
To test how different sources of information affect choice be-
havior, we included conditions in which participants were informed 
about choices of a computer and previous choices of participants. 
Before testing mixed effects models, we performed a repeated mea-
sures ANOVA to test whether participants changed their average 
percentage risky choices in the information conditions, indepen-
dent of any other factors such as risk level, ambiguity level and age. 
In the repeated measures ANOVA we included factors ‘condition’ 
with levels ‘social and computer’ and the factor ‘others’ choice’ with 
levels ‘risky’ and ‘safer’. If the ANOVA was significant, we followed 
up using paired t tests to determine which conditions were signifi-
cantly different from solo. In the mixed effects models we then 
aimed to parse out which factors were related to changes in risky 
choice. In the mixed effects models, condition was included in the 
models as a factor with levels solo, social risky, social safe, computer 
risky, computer safe. In all models in which condition was included, 
the solo category served as the reference category. Any significant 
effects for condition can therefore be interpreted as a difference 
between the condition of interest and the solo condition. To test 
whether magnitude of change in risky choice was different with age 
we tested for condition by age interactions. A significant interaction 
would mean that the magnitude of change in percent risky choice is 
stronger for some ages than for others.
To test for developmental effects, we included age in the models 
as a predictor. To detect different age- related patterns of change, 
we included predictors for linear and quadratic (adolescent- peaking) 
age. Models with a quadratic predictor of age also included the lin-
ear predictor for age. These age terms were not collinear (r = 0). 
Significant linear effects would indicate a continuous increase or 
decrease over age. Based on previous literature (Braams et al., 2015; 
Defoe et al., 2015) we hypothesized quadratic effects of age. The 
age range of our sample (12–22 years) was chosen such that signifi-
cant quadratic effects of age would indicate effects that show high-
est or lowest values in late adolescence.
We used non- linear mixed effects models to determine best fit-
ting models to the data. All models were fitted with full information 
maximum likelihood estimation. Model fitting was performed using 
R (R Core Team, 2014) and package lme4 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015). As choice on the trial- by- trial level is a dichotomous 
variable, logistic regressions were used. A model with an interaction 
between the linear and quadratic predictor for age and condition 
and an interaction between expected value difference and ambigu-
ity would be modeled as follows:
Models were compared based on the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974). AIC is a goodness of fit parameter 
that takes into account the number of parameters. Lower AIC 
values indicate better model fit. All reported parameters for best 
fitting models are unstandardized. Improvement of model fit was 
compared against a null model in which a fixed and random inter-
cept were included, but no predictors of interest. Log likelihood 
ratio tests were employed to formally test improvement of model 
fit for nested models.
3  | RESULTS
The aim of the current study was to investigate how information 
about peer choice changes risky decision- making across age. The 
results are built up in three steps. We first fitted non- linear mixed 
effects models on the solo condition to establish baseline choice 
behavior. We then tested whether the information conditions (i.e. 
social and computer) change risky decision- making. In the last step 
we investigated developmental effects of social information.
3.1 | Choice behavior in the solo condition
Before testing effects in the information conditions, we first de-
termined the best fitting model for the solo condition. This analy-
sis informs base attitudes towards risk and ambiguity across age. 
Model fitting was performed in two steps. We predicted that the 
difference between the expected values for the safer and risky op-
tions and the ambiguity of the lotteries would modulate participant 
choices. Therefore, we fitted models including predictors represent-
ing the difference in expected value between the safer and risky 
lotteries, and ambiguity of the lotteries. We compared a null model 
with a fixed and random intercept against four alternative models: (i) 
fixed main effect of expected value difference, (ii) fixed main effect 
of ambiguity, (iii) a fixed main effect of expected value difference 
and fixed main effect of ambiguity, and (iv) a fixed main effect of 
expected value, fixed main effect of ambiguity and an interaction 
effect between expected value difference and ambiguity. Results 
showed that a model with an interaction effect between expected 
value difference and ambiguity of the choice best described the 
choice data in the solo condition (see Table 1 for model fit and pa-
rameter estimates).
After determination of the best fitting model (EV difference * 
Ambiguity) we added age to this model to investigate improvement 
model<−glmer(choice∼poly(Age,2,raw = TRUE) ∗Condition+
Ambiguity
∗
EVDifference + (1|participantID), data =
data, family = binomial, control = glmerControl (optimizer
= �bobyqa�), nAGQ = 10)
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of model fit. Four additional models were fitted. All four additional 
models included the interaction between expected value and am-
biguity. In addition to this interaction, two models included a main 
effect of age: (i) one model with only a linear fixed main effect for 
age, and (ii) one model with both a linear and a quadratic fixed main 
effect for age. Two models included both a main effect and an in-
teraction effect of age: (iii) one model included a fixed main effect 
of the linear age and an interaction between the linear fixed effect 
of age, expected value difference and ambiguity, and lastly (iv) one 
model included a fixed linear main effect of age, a fixed quadratic 
main effect of age and interactions between the linear predictor 
of age, expected value difference and ambiguity, and the quadratic 
predictor of age, expected value difference and ambiguity.
Model comparison showed that model iv with an interaction effect 
between the quadratic predictor for age, expected value difference 
and ambiguity was the best fitting model (see Table 1, Table 2 and 
Figure 3). In this model, there was a significant linear main effect of 
age showing that risky choice decreased with age. Furthermore, there 
were main effects of expected value difference and ambiguity. The 
main effect of expected value difference showed that participants 
were increasingly more likely to select the risky option as the expected 
value difference between the safe and risky option increased. This ef-
fect was in the expected direction since for choice pairs with a higher 
expected value difference, the risky choice was the mathematically 
more optimal choice. The main effect of ambiguity showed that par-
ticipants were less likely to select the risky option as ambiguity of the 
choice increased. This is in line with ambiguity aversion.
The three- way interaction between age, expected value differ-
ence and ambiguity indicated that the interaction between expected 
value difference and ambiguity changed with age. Visual inspection 
of the two- way interaction between expected value difference and 
ambiguity indicated that participants discriminated more between 
mathematically optimal (i.e. higher expected value) and less optimal 
choices as ambiguity decreased. In other words, when ambiguity 
was high, participants refrained from choosing the risky option even 
when this was mathematically the more optimal decision. When 
ambiguity was low, participants chose the risky option more often 
when this was the mathematically more optimal choice. The three- 
way interaction indicated that expected value difference and ambi-
guity differentially interacted with age. Visual inspection of the plots 
in Figure 3 showed that risky choice decreased over age, except for 
the condition where ambiguity was low and the risky option was the 
mathematically optimal choice. In this case, there was no change in 
percent risky choice across age. Note that although a model with a 
quadratic predictor for age fit the data best, the quadratic predic-
tor for age was not significant. This shows that the quadratic pre-
dictor explains some amount of meaningful variance, but does not 
itself reach significance. In this case we interpret the significant age 
terms, which in this case was a linear interaction with age. The plots 
in Figure 3 therefore depict the linear effects of age.
3.2 | Choice behavior in the information conditions
To evaluate the influence of the social- and computer- delivered in-
formation, we first tested whether participants’ average percentage 
of risky choice changed as a factor of the information conditions. A 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed with percent risky choice 
as the dependent variable and condition (social vs. computer) and oth-
ers’ choice (risky vs. safe) as the manipulated variables. Percent risky 
choice was aggregated per participant and per condition. This analysis 
Model df AIC Log lik.
Step 1
Null model (fixed and 
random intercept only)
1 2 6627
EV difference 2 3 5688 1 vs. 2 p <0.001
Ambiguity 3 3 6025 1 vs. 3 p <0.001
EV difference + ambiguity 4 4 4945 3 vs. 4 p <0.001
EV difference* ambiguity 5 5 4649* 4 vs. 5 p <0.001
Step 2
Age1 + EV difference* 
ambiguity
6 6 4648
Age2 + EV difference* 
ambiguity
7 7 4650 6 vs. 7 p=0.581
Age1* EV difference* 
ambiguity
8 9 4642 7 vs. 8 p=0.003
Age2* EV difference* 
ambiguity
9 13 4633* 8 vs. 9 p=0.002
Note. Preferred models (indicated by *) were selected based on AIC values. EV difference refers to 
the difference in expected value for the safer and the risky option. Age1 refers to the linear predictor 
of age, Age2 refers to the quadratic predictor of age. Note that for the models with a quadratic age 
term the linear age term was always included as well. Models with interaction effects also included 
a main effect for these factors. Log lik refers to a log likelihood ratio test.
TABLE  1 Effective degrees of freedom 
(df) and AIC values for models with 
expected value difference and ambiguity 
for the solo condition
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revealed a significant interaction between condition (social vs. com-
puter) and others’ choice (risky vs. safer) (F(1, 292) = 9.48, p = 0.002). 
We then followed up this interaction with post- hoc t tests to evalu-
ate whether each condition differed from the baseline solo condition. 
A significant difference would indicate that choices in that condition 
were significantly altered based on the information manipulation.
When participants saw that the other participant made a safer 
choice, participants were more likely to also choose the safer op-
tion relative to their baseline choice (i.e. when no social information 
was visible) (t(97)	=	−2.561,	p = 0.011). The opposite was true for 
the risky condition. When participants saw that the other partici-
pant chose the risky option they were more likely to also choose 
the risky option, significant at a trend level (t(97) = 1.94, p = 0.055), 
relative to their baseline choice when no social information was vis-
ible. Choice behavior was not significantly different from the solo 
condition when participants viewed the choices of a computer, ei-
ther when the computer chose the safer option (t(98) = 0.24, p = 
0.81) or the risky option (t(98) = 0.02, p = 0.97) (see Figure 4).
F IGURE  3 Visualization of the three- way interaction between the quadratic predictor of age, expected value difference and ambiguity 
in the solo condition. For visualization purposes expected value difference is divided into three groups: higher expected value for the risky 
option (EV difference >1), expected value equivalent for both options (EV difference between 1 and 0), higher expected value for the safer 
option (EV difference <0). Ambiguity is divided into high ambiguity (60% and 80% ambiguity), medium ambiguity (20% and 40% ambiguity) 
and no ambiguity (0% ambiguity). Dots represent raw data averaged per age year. These plots show that participants distinguished between 
expected value when ambiguity was low. When ambiguity was high, participants selected the safe option on the majority of the trials. Note 
that although the quadratic regressor of age is displayed for transparency, only the linear term in this model is significant. This indicates that 
the curvature of the predicted model fit is not significantly different across age, but the slope is




Intercept −2.58 0.32 −8.10  
<0.001***
Age1 −0.17 0.06 −2.69 0.007**
Age2 0.03 0.02 1.10 0.270
EV difference 3.33 0.18 18.60 <0.001***
Ambiguity −0.77 0.36 −2.13 0.033*
Age1* EV difference 0.12 0.03 3.83 <0.001***
Age2* EV difference −0.04 0.01 −2.92 0.003**
Age1* Ambiguity 0.09 0.07 1.41 0.159
Age2* Ambiguity 0.02 0.03 0.80 0.425
EV difference* Ambiguity −3.76 0.34 −11.16 <0.001***
Age1* EV difference* 
Ambiguity
−0.20 0.06 −3.23 0.001**
Age2* EV difference* 
Ambiguity
0.03 0.02 1.42 0.156
Asterisks indicate significance at p < 0.05 (*), p < 0.01 (**) and p < 0.001 (***).
TABLE  2 Parameter estimates for all 
parameters in the best fitting model for 
the solo condition
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3.3 | Developmental patterns of social 
information use
We performed model fitting to test developmental patterns of percent-
age choices for the risky option in the social information condition. We 
did not test for developmental effects in the computer condition, be-
cause previous analyses showed that there were no changes in percent-
age risky choice in the computer conditions. However, for completeness 
we do report analyses for the computer condition in Supplementary 
Tables 1–6. We fitted models with predictors for expected value differ-
ence, ambiguity, condition and age. Model fitting started with the best 
fitting model for the solo condition, that is, the model with an interac-
tion between expected value difference and ambiguity. To test whether 
social information changed percentage risky choice, we included condi-
tion (i.e. solo, social risky, social safe) in the model. Solo served as the 
reference category and, as such, any significant effect of the social risky 
and/or social safe conditions would indicate that percent risky choice 
changed due to social information. In the first step, two additional 
models were compared against the base model with just an interaction 
between expected value difference and ambiguity: (i) a model with a 
main effect of condition and an interaction between expected value 
difference and ambiguity, and (ii) a model with a three- way interaction 
between condition, expected value difference, and ambiguity. Model 
fit comparisons showed that the model with a main effect of social in-
formation condition and an interaction effect between expected value 
difference and ambiguity fit best (see Table 3).
In the second step, we included age in the model. We tested for 
interaction effects of linear and quadratic predictors of age and con-
dition. A significant interaction between age and condition would 
indicate that the change in risky choice for a condition changes with 
age. Main effects of age were included in the model. A main effect 
of age would indicate average developmental patterns over both 
conditions and were not tested separately as we were specifically 
interested in how changes in risky choice changed over age in the so-
cial information conditions in comparison to the solo condition. We 
tested two additional models: (i) a model with an interaction between 
the linear predictor of age and condition, and (ii) a model with inter-
actions between the linear and quadratic predictors of age, and con-
dition. Model comparison showed that inclusion of both a quadratic 
and a linear age term improved model fit. The best fitting model was 
a model with an interaction between social information condition 
and age and an interaction between ambiguity and expected value 
difference (see Table 3). The best fitting model included no interac-
tions between age and ambiguity or age and expected value differ-
ence. This means that the effect of social information across age is 
similar for all levels of ambiguity and expected value difference.
Further inspection of the significance of each predictor in the 
best fitting model showed that the two- way interaction between the 
quadratic predictor of age and condition was significant (see Table 4 
and Figure 5). Visualization of the model fit showed that when an-
other participant chose the risky option, the participants between 
approximately 15 and 17 years old were least likely to select the risky 
option. Visualization of model fit for the condition in which the other 
participant chose the safer option showed that the effect of social 
information was strongest for participants between approximately 
15 and 18 years old for this condition (see Table 4 and Figure 5).
F IGURE  4 Percent risky choice per condition. P- values indicate 
difference between each condition and the solo condition. Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean. Compared to the 
solo condition in which participants did not see any additional 
information, participants were more likely to select the safe 
option when they saw that the other participant selected the safe 
option and to select the risky option when they saw that the other 
participant selected the risky option. When participants viewed the 
choices of a computer, they did not alter their choices
TABLE  3 Effective degrees of freedom (df) and AIC values for 
models with expected value difference and ambiguity for the social 
information condition model





Condition + EV 
difference* 
Ambiguity




3 13 13493 2 vs 3 p=0.675
Step 2
Age1* Condition + 
EV difference* 
Ambiguity
4 10 13480 2 vs 4 p=0.016
Age2* Condition + 
EV difference* 
Ambiguity
5 13 13476* 4 vs 5 p=0.015
Note. Preferred models (indicated by *) were selected based on AIC val-
ues. EV difference refers to the difference in expected value for the safer 
and the risky option. Age1 refers to the linear predictor of age, Age2 re-
fers to the quadratic predictor of age. Note that for the models with a 
quadratic age term the linear age term was always included as well. 
Models with interaction effects also included a main effect for these fac-
tors. Log lik refers to a log likelihood ratio test.
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3.4 | Raven progressive matrices
To test whether average percentage of risky choice in the solo 
condition was related to non- verbal fluid intelligence we performed 
regression analyses with number of correct items on the Raven test 
(non- verbal fluid intelligence). The average number of items correct 
was 6.1 (SD = 2.07). Due to outliers in the data, robust regressions 
were run. As expected, number of correct items was positively re-
lated to age (B = 0.26, t(96) = 4.3, p < 0.001). However, we did not 
observe evidence that the average percentage of risky choice in the 
solo condition was related to number of correct items on the Raven 
progressive	matrices	(B	=	−1.45,	t(96)	=	−1.57,	p = 0.127). This sug-
gests that there is no evidence that percent risky choice on the lot-
tery task is related to non- verbal fluid intelligence.
4  | DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigated how social information influences 
risky and ambiguous choices in adolescence. We used an economic 
decision- making approach in which participants made choices be-
tween safer and more risky lotteries. Lotteries were systematically 
varied on levels of risk and ambiguity. To test how information about 
choice preferences of others influenced decision- making, partici-
pants could sometimes see choices of supposed others. Specificity 
of social information was tested by inclusion of a computer condi-
tion. Results showed that in the social information condition, par-
ticipants followed the choices of the other participants both toward 
risk and toward safety. Analyses testing for changes in this tendency 
across adolescence showed that late adolescents were least likely to 
follow a risky choice and that this age group was most likely to fol-
low the safe choice of another participant. Participants only changed 
their behavior when they saw choice information of a social agent, 
as we observed no evidence that participants changed their choices 
based on the random choice of a computer. Together, these results 




Intercept −2.30 0.26 −8.85 <0.001***
Social safe −0.09 0.05 −1.83 0.068
Social risky 0.01 0.02 0.65 0.518
Age1 −0.38 0.09 −4.40 <0.001***
Age2 0.06 0.08 0.76 0.449
Ambiguity −0.59 0.13 −4.59 <0.001***
EV difference 2.88 0.06 46.04 <0.001***
Social safe* Age1 0.04 0.02 2.37 0.018**
Social safe* Age2 0.02 0.01 2.93 0.003**
Social risky* Age1 0.01 0.02 0.33 0.738
Social risky* Age2 0.01 0.01 2.05 0.041*
EV diff* Ambiguity −3.41 0.12 −28.48 <0.001***
Note. Asterisks indicate significance at p < 0.05 (*); p < 0.01 (**); and p < 0.001 (***).
TABLE  4 Parameter estimates for all 
parameters in the best fitting model for 
the social information condition models
F IGURE  5 Representation of best fitting models for the change 
in percent risky choice in the condition in which participants saw a 
risky choice from a previous participant and the condition in which 
participants saw a safe choice from a previous participant. Change 
is plotted against the solo condition. Values above zero indicate an 
increase in percent risky choices and values below zero indicate 
an increase in percent safe choices. Lines represent predicted data 
fit by the favored model (see Table 4) and bands represent 95% 
confidence intervals. The fit lines show that adolescents were 
most influenced by safe decisions of the other participant, and that 
this age group was least influenced by risky decisions of the other 
participant
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suggest that information about others’ choices is a powerful modi-
fier for behavior and that this information is used differently across 
adolescence and early adulthood.
4.1 | Developmental patterns of risky and 
ambiguous choice
We started by determining the baseline choice preferences of par-
ticipants across age. Results showed that when participants made 
choices without external information, their choices were influenced 
by both the risk and ambiguity levels of the choice options. As ex-
pected, participants were more likely to choose the risky option 
when the risky option was increasingly advantageous (i.e. as the 
expected value difference increased). This indicates that partici-
pants understood the concept of expected value and that expected 
value differences between the choice options guided their decisions. 
Participants were less likely to choose the risky option when the am-
biguity of the choice increased. This is in line with prior work show-
ing that adults exhibit ambiguity aversion in risky choice situations 
(Levy et al., 2010). Together, these findings show that participants 
took the expected value and the ambiguity of the choice into ac-
count in a rational manner, to decide when to opt in to a risky choice.
We then investigated how risky choice changed with age. We 
found no changes in risk tolerance across age. Although this seems 
surprising at first since adolescents are generally thought to take more 
risks than adults in the real world and therefore one might expect that 
adolescents also take more risks than adults in the laboratory, the 
literature on developmental patterns of risky decision- making in the 
laboratory shows mixed results. Some studies have found increased 
risky decision- making in adolescence (Braams et al., 2015; Chein 
et al., 2011; Powers et al., 2018) whereas other studies do not find 
differences (Blankenstein et al., 2016; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2008). 
Adolescent increases in risk taking behavior in the real world are not 
only driven by the analysis of objective risk in a situation. Ambiguity 
tolerance could also lead individuals toward risky choices, in that they 
are more willing to opt in to a decision in which the values of possible 
outcomes are highly divergent, but their probabilities are unknown. 
In the current study, we used an economic decision- making task in 
which we were able to distinguish between risk and ambiguity toler-
ance. Three other studies have taken a similar approach. When ambig-
uous choices were part of the experimental context, only one study 
found evidence for increased risk tolerance in adolescence (van den 
Bos & Hertwig, 2017) and two of these studies did not find increased 
risk tolerance in adolescence (Blankenstein et al., 2016; Tymula et al., 
2012). Possibly when explicit ambiguity is introduced into the choices, 
this is a factor that steers adolescents away from taking more risk in 
the pure risky, that is, non- ambiguous, choices. Future work should 
systematically test choice behavior under different types of ambiguity 
to better understand in which situations adolescents and adults take 
risk and which underlying mechanism gives rise to this behavior.
Previous work investigating developmental patterns of ambi-
guity tolerance found increased ambiguity tolerance in adolescence 
(Blankenstein et al., 2016; Tymula et al., 2012; van den Bos & Hertwig, 
2017). Furthermore, there was a relationship between ambiguity tol-
erance and real- life risky decision- making (van den Bos & Hertwig, 
2017). Unexpectedly and not in line with our hypothesis, in the current 
study we did not find increased ambiguity tolerance in adolescence. 
One difference between our study and the three studies that previ-
ously investigated ambiguity tolerance across age is that in the current 
study ambiguity was manipulated between trials, but within a trial 
ambiguity was held constant. Therefore, our task does not directly 
give participants the option of selecting between an ambiguous and a 
non- ambiguous choice because both choice options were equivalently 
ambiguous. In all previous studies there was a safe, sure option, and 
an ambiguous option. When making decisions with equal amounts of 
ambiguity, adolescents did not display differences in ambiguity toler-
ance. Possibly in these situations, the focus could shift more to the dif-
ference in expected value, that is, riskiness, of the choices and not on 
the ambiguity. Future work could further test whether there is a shift 
in attention to the riskiness of the choice options when both options 
are ambiguous. If so, this could have implications for the type of risky 
decisions adolescents are susceptible to in real life.
4.2 | Developmental patterns of social 
information use
To test how social information moderated risky choice behavior, 
we included a condition in which participants were informed about 
choices of a peer. In the current study, results from the social infor-
mation condition showed that participants followed both risky and 
safe choices of peers. These results replicate previous work show-
ing influence of choice information in an adult sample (Chung et al., 
2015). Following the choice of others was not due to blind following 
of the choice that was on the screen, since participants did not alter 
their choices when they viewed choices of a computer, showing that 
participants distinguished between different sources of information 
and that social information is more persuasive than randomly gener-
ated information. This is in line with previous work using a non- social 
reference condition (Fareri, Niznikiewicz, Lee, & Delgado, 2012; 
Moretti, Dragone, & di Pellegrino, 2009).
The key tests of the current study concerned developmental 
changes in effects of information on others’ previous choice. Analysis 
of developmental effects in the social information condition showed 
differential patterns of age for risky and safe peer choices. When the 
other participant made a risky choice, late adolescent participants 
in the sample were least likely to follow this choice. This result was 
contrary to what we expected based on previous work showing ad-
olescent increases in risky decision- making in a peer context (Cascio 
et al., 2015; Chein et al., 2011; Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; Smith, 
Chein, & Steinberg, 2014).
A key difference between the current study and previous work is 
the type of peer influence manipulation. In particular, active peer mon-
itoring and peer encouragement of risky behavior appear to be moti-
vators for changes towards more risky behavior (Centifanti, Modecki, 
MacLellan, & Gowling, 2016; Reynolds, MacPherson, Schwartz, Fox, & 
Lejuez, 2014). When considering the underlying processes that could 
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differ between peer influence manipulations, there could be several 
possible mechanisms that are less active in the present social manip-
ulation relative to those that include peers who actively monitor the 
choices. In the current study, we presented information about the 
previous choices of peers; participants did not receive feedback about 
their choices and the peer did not observe their choices. Thus, in the 
present study participants likely lacked social motivation for changes 
in behavior whereas active peer monitoring could bring forward more 
explicit motivations to self- present as risky (Cohen & Prinstein, 2006; 
Mayeux, Sandstrom, & Cillessen, 2008).
When the other participant made a safe choice, mid- to- late ado-
lescents were most likely to follow this choice. Most previous work 
has focused on how peers influence decisions towards making more 
risky decisions and therefore this finding might seem surprising at first. 
However, some studies that have looked at peer influence towards 
more safe decisions have shown that adolescents also conform to-
wards safer decisions when a peer exhibits safer norms (Cascio et al., 
2015; Knoll, Leung, Foulkes, & Blakemore, 2017). Similarly to risky 
decision- making, the situations in which peers can move decisions to-
wards safety is dependent on the type of peer influence and the type 
of decisions. It could be that adolescents take information about safer 
choices of their peers into account more when the peer is not around 
(Knoll et al., 2017). Risky decision- making such as risky driving or un-
derage drinking are often reputation enhancing for adolescents (Ellis 
et al., 2012); maybe, safer decisions are not status enhancing or give 
great social benefit to the adolescent. Possibly, when the peer is not 
around to judge or monitor them, they are more likely to follow the safe 
choice. This could indicate that choices towards safer decisions and 
towards more risky decisions are dependent on different mechanisms.
The present findings, when integrated with the existing liter-
ature, suggest that changes in real- life risky decision- making in 
adolescence could be driven by social motivations, and as a result ad-
olescents are more willing to follow peers toward safety when they 
are not being actively monitored whereas they are more willing to 
follow peers toward risk when they are being monitored (and there-
fore could enjoy the reputational status- enhancing effect of risky 
choice). More research will be required to resolve these possibilities.
Lastly, the magnitude of social influence was not dependent on the 
properties of the different choice options, as there were no interactions 
between risk level and ambiguity level of the choices. We expected that 
for choices in which the ambiguity was higher, social influence would 
also be higher as participants were expected to use others’ choices as 
information for their own choice. However, social influence appears to 
be equivalent across choice features. Future work could investigate 
whether other types of peer influence interact with ambiguity level.
4.3 | Limitations
The current study used an economic decision- making approach to 
investigate risky decision- making. While this approach allows us to 
systematically manipulate choice options and thus allows for high 
experimental control, this is at the cost of reduced ecological valid-
ity. Choices in the real world are seldom repeated and represented in 
simple numerical values as is required for laboratory tasks, which may 
have reduced the excitement for participants. Furthermore, although 
great care was taken to ensure the validity of the peer manipulation, 
the peers were described as unknown individuals with whom the 
participant would not have contact. To investigate how real peers in-
fluence behavior, future studies could use risk preferences of actual 
peers. Lastly, to investigate how risky behavior changes over time 
and to better distinguish between individual differences and devel-
opmental effects, participants should be followed longitudinally.
4.4 | Conclusion
Taken together, the results of this study show that social influence 
is a powerful modifier for behavior across age. The current study 
revealed that information about previous choices of peers differ-
entially influenced adolescents’ decision- making towards safe and 
risky choices. Adolescents were most influenced by safe choices 
of their peers, and least influenced by risky choices of their peers. 
These results show that the effect of peers on adolescents’ deci-
sions is less ubiquitous and more specific than previously assumed.
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